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Abstract
Why is that the achievements of some disinﬂations from low and moderate peaks are long-
lived, whereas in others the gains in the inﬂationary front dissipate quickly? Based on an index
of the sustainability of disinﬂations proposed in the paper, various competing explanations of
what determines sustainability are tested. Three factors, potentially at the top of the list of
many researchers, are shown to be insigniﬁcant: oil shocks, ﬁscal policy and inﬂation targeting.
Nevertheless, other important features such as the exchange rate regime, achieving a low inﬂation
rate during the disinﬂation and food price shocks are shown to be important variables driving the
sustainability records.
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Resumen
¿Por qué los logros en algunas desinﬂaciones son duraderos mientras que en otras los triunfos
en el frente inﬂacionario se disipan con rapidez? En este artículo construimos un índice de sosteni-
bilidad de las desinﬂaciones y estimamos qué factores lo determinan. Encontramos que el régimen
de tasa cambio, lograr una inﬂación baja y choques a los precios mundiales de alimentos, son de-
terminantes signiﬁcativos de la sostenibilidad de las desinﬂaciones. Otros factores como la política
ﬁscal, los esquemas de inﬂación objetivo y los precios del petróleo, resultan menos importantes.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One remarkable macroeconomic feature of the 1990s is the low inﬂation achieved both by developed
and developing countries. Indeed, during the second half of the decade, G7 nations exhibited median
inﬂation rates below the 3% mark, while Latin-America —notorious for its inﬂation during the 70s
and 80s— achieved median inﬂation rates in the single digit range. Figure 1 illustrates the evolution
of the median inﬂation rates in both groups of countries since 1972.
As we document in the paper, the higher inﬂation rates observed by developed and developing
countries during the 70s and 80s are not explained by a lack of disinﬂationary attempts, but rather by
their more modest success in keeping in place the gains of those disinﬂations (the precise deﬁnitions
of disinﬂation and moderate peaks are given in section 2). Based on the terminology proposed in
this paper, disinﬂations of the 70s and 80s were less sustainable than those of the 90s. Why are the
achievements of some disinﬂations sustained, whereas in other cases gains on the inﬂationary front
are rapidly lost? That is the question addressed in this paper.
Similar questions to our’s have been asked in the literature on stabilization, i.e. the branch
dealing with disinﬂations from high inﬂation peaks (e.g., Hamann and Prati, 2002; Calvo and Vegh,
1999). Nevertheless, after the worldwide disinﬂation of the 1990s, it has become apparent that
disinﬂations from very high inﬂation rates no longer constitute the norm, not even in Latin America
and the Caribbean (LAC). Most policymakers will face, in the present and the near future, questions
related to disinﬂations from moderate or low inﬂation rates and sustaining reasonable price stability.
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Figure 1: Median inﬂation rates.
begins to ﬁll.1
Our study is unique in that it tackles the analysis of the sustainability of disinﬂations from a
novel perspective. We build a sustainability index based on the behavior of CPI inﬂation following
the end of a period of disinﬂation. Then, we estimate the index using the sample of 56 disinﬂations
of LAC and G7 countries identiﬁed in Hofstetter (2004a,b). It will be shown that G7 countries have
better sustainability records than LAC ones, but that the gap between the two has been shrinking.
Moreover, both have experienced a notable improvement in the sustainability of disinﬂations during
the 90s.
After exploiting the cross-episode variation in the index to investigate the main stylized facts, we
take steps to understand what determined the success or failure of these episodes. There are several
possible determinants underlying the cross-episode variation in the sustainability of disinﬂations.
Another contribution of this paper is an assessment of the empirical relevance of those determinants.
An obvious candidate for explaining the sustainability of disinﬂations is supply shocks. It would
seem natural, for example, to blame the low sustainablity of disinﬂations during the 70s on rising
oil prices. Alternatively, world food prices coulda l s oh a v ea ni m p a c to nt h esustainability of dis-
1There is some scattered country-speciﬁc evidence exploiting the time-series dimension of the data. For instance,
Shapiro (1994) concludes that most disinﬂations in the US have had only temporary eﬀects on the inﬂation rate —to
use the terminology of our paper, they were mostly unsustainable. To our knowledge, there are no studies investigating
the sustainability of disinﬂations across countries as we do here.
2inﬂations. Indeed, Boschen and Weiss (2003) ﬁnd that world food prices are a signiﬁcant predictor
of inﬂation starts in OECD nations. Interestingly, consistent with Boschen and Weiss’ ﬁndings, we
show that world food inﬂation plays a larger role in the determination of sustainability than oil
prices. In fact, the signiﬁcance of oil shocks turns out to be weak.
We also take advantage of the great array of exchange rate regimes across the diﬀerent disinﬂa-
tionary episodes. The role of the exchange rate regime and its impact on macroeconomic variables
has recently received a lot of attention, pushed by the development of new ways for measuring this
institutional variable (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2003; Dubas,
Lee and Mark, 2005). Our paper further contributes to the understanding of exchange rate regimes
by analyzing whether or not they play a role in determining the sustainability of disinﬂations. We
ﬁnd that an increase in exchange rate ﬂexibility reduces the sustainability of disinﬂations.
We also explore the role of the inﬂationary characteristics that precede each episode and the
importance of the inﬂation trough achieved during the disinﬂation. We ﬁnd a pattern worthy of
note and with important implications for policymakers: Disinﬂations that bring inﬂa t i o nd o w nt o
low rates (5% or less) are more likely to succeed in keeping those gains in place.
The role of openness in determining inﬂation has also received attention from economists, par-
ticularly after Romer’s (1993) famous paper. More recently, authors like Rogoﬀ (2003) and Razin
(2004) have advanced the idea that globalization played an important role in the recent worldwide
disinﬂation. We contribute to the debate, providing evidence of the importance of openness to the
success of disinﬂations. Interestingly, the variable turns out to be irrelevant.
Since the early 90s, an increasing number of developed and developing countries have adopted
inﬂation targeting (IT) regimes to conduct monetary policy. A large literature, both theoretical and
empirical, has studied inﬂation targeting regimes. We contribute to the IT literature by testing if
3such a regime helps sustain disinﬂations. Our results suggest that inﬂation targeting does not play
any signiﬁcant role in determining sustainablity. We also ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy is irrelevant.
We also control for several factors proposed in the political economy literature. We test if partisan
variables (that is, the orientation of the party in power) and political institutions and conditions (the
stability of the political regime, the degree of democracy, etc.) aﬀect sustainability. The coeﬃcients
on political economy variables that we explore exhibit the sign predicted by theory but they are
mostly insigniﬁcant.
Finally, we consider whether US inﬂation aﬀects the sustainablity of disinﬂations abroad. Boschen
and Weiss (2003) ﬁnd strong evidence that US inﬂation plays an important role in triggering inﬂation
abroad. In related literature (e.g., Lane, 2001; Canova, 2005), the results indicate that US mone-
tary shocks have important consequences abroad. In line with those papers, we ﬁnd that a higher
US inﬂation reduces the sustainability of disinﬂations abroad. Even though the eﬀect goes in the
expected direction, the statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient is not robust under some alternative
speciﬁcations.
In what follows, section 2 proposes a measure of sustainability and describes the main stylized
facts. In section 3, the estimation techniques are described and the main empirical ﬁndings are
reported. Section 4 concludes by discussing policymaking implications and proposes some future
avenues of research.
42 Sustainability: Measurement and Stylized Facts
2.1 Measurement
Throughout this paper, we refer to the “sustainability of disinﬂations.” Before proceeding any further
then, it is necessary to specify what is meant by sustainability and by disinﬂation.
Disinﬂations: We will borrow the set of disinﬂations identiﬁed in Hofstetter (2004a, b). Here
we highlight the main characteristics of the methodology used to identify disinﬂations from low and
moderate trend inﬂation rates.2
A disinﬂation starts at the inﬂation peak (labeled period 0), ends at the trough (period T), and
requires that: (i) the peak be 30% or less; (ii) the inﬂa t i o nr a t em u s td r o pb ya tl e a s t1 . 5 %p o i n t s
between peak and trough; (iii) the inﬂation should fall 1/4 or more from its initial level (that is,
if the peak is 16% we require inﬂation to drop to at least 12%); (iv) a historical records revision
corroborates that economic policy was indeed disinﬂationary. Hofstetter (2004a, b) applied this rule
to LAC and G7 nations for the period 1973-2000, and identiﬁed 56 episodes. This is the sample
of disinﬂations used throughout this paper to track sustainability after period T. Table A1 in the
appendix lists the episodes and their characteristics.
Sustainability: In measuring sustainability, one should track the evolution of inﬂation after the
trough and take into account the fall in inﬂation that occurs during the disinﬂation. To see this, note
that a disinﬂation that brings inﬂa t i o nd o w nf r o m2 0t o5 %i sv e r yd i ﬀerent from one that brings it
d o w nf r o m8t o5 % .I fi nb o t hc a s e si n ﬂa t i o ni ny e a rT +1rises to 8%, disinﬂa t i o ni nt h el a t t e rc a s e
may be considered as having been totally unsuccessful while in the the former case, it can still claim
partial victory over price increases. Taking into account these elements, we deﬁne sustainability in
2Trend inﬂation corresponds to an eight-quarter moving average of the quarterly CPI inﬂation rate, as in Ball
(1994).
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Figure 2: Sustainability and disinﬂations.





where πj is the inﬂation rate for period j. In (1), the numerator is the gap between the peak and
inﬂation at T + i, while the denominator corresponds to the size of the original disinﬂation. Larger
values of the index correspond to better sustainability records —i.e., the dashed path in ﬁgure 2 yields
to a smaller ST+i than the dotted trajectory for any T + i.
The sustainability measure that we use throughout the paper is the average of ST+i over the















/(N − M +1 )
π0 − πT
(2)
This expression has several properties. (i) If the average inﬂation following period T is equal to
πT,t h e nS =1 . This would represent a case of perfect sustainability. (ii) If the average inﬂation
following period T is equal to π0 —i.e., disinﬂation is, on average, exactly reversed— then S =0 . This
corresponds to a very low sustainability. In a sense then, S represents the proportion of the original
6fall in the inﬂation rate that is sustained after T. (iii) S is not constrained between 0 and 1. Indeed,
if after T there are years of very high inﬂation, S could fall below 0. Conversely, if after T+1 the
average inﬂation keeps falling, S could jump above 1.
To determine S for each episode, N and M have to be given speciﬁcv a l u e s . I nt h eb a s e l i n e
speciﬁcation, the inﬂation rate is tracked for four years following the trough, i.e., M =1and N =4 .
This way, S starts tracking sustainability immediately following the disinﬂation, and follows it for a
period of time roughly equivalent to the length of an average disinﬂation (Hofstetter, 2004a, shows
that disinﬂations last 3.5 years on average). In the ﬁnal part of section 3, we test the robustness of
our ﬁndings by estimating a sustainability index where M =2and N =4 .
2.2 Stylized Facts
Table 1 reports the average value for S, separating G7 from LAC countries, and also separating
the 90s from the preceding decades.3 More disaggregated results can be found in Table A1 in the
appendix. Three important stylized facts stand out:
(i) G7 countries have a better sustainability record than LAC countries: roughly three quarters
of the fall in the inﬂation rate in G7 nations was sustained whereas in the LAC countries, less than
half of the fall in inﬂation was sustained.
(ii) In both the LAC and G7 countries, the respective record for the 90s is substantially better
than that for earlier decades. The change is more dramatic in the LAC countries. The average value
for S in the 70s and 80s is 0.22, whereas that for the 90s reaches 0.82.
(iii) The LAC countries are catching-up: during the earlier decades, an average regional gap of
40 points existed, whereas during the 90s the gap fell to 16 points.
3A very large outlier (Mexico 1978-79) has been dropped: ST+3 and ST+4 (for that episode) coincide with the
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Figure 3: Evolution of S over time.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate those stylized facts further. Figure 3 plots S against the calendar year
in which the trough occurred. The chart includes trend lines for each region, obtained by regressing
S on the year of the trough. In ﬁgure 3, it is evident that sustainability records have improved over
time in both regions, as indicated by the positive slopes of the trend lines. That G7 countries have
higher S averages is supported by the fact that the trend line for the G7 countries is above that for
the LAC countries. Finally it is also clear that the gap between the two has been shrinking inasmuch
as both trend lines move closer over time. Lastly, ﬁgure 4 plots the average inﬂation rate across
episodes splitting the sample by groups and by decades. All the stylized facts described above can
again be identiﬁed in this representation of the data.















Figure 4: Average inﬂation across episodes.
3 What Determines S?
In this section, the potential groups of determinants of S are identiﬁed (and tested) using several
hypotheses documented by economic theory and empirical ﬁndings of other papers in the literature.
To facilitate interpretation, we have grouped the independent variables into 6 diﬀerent categories:
supply shocks, exchange rate regime, inﬂation and openness, policy variables, political economy
variables and US inﬂation. In each case, we justify the presence of the variable, detail how it is
measured and discuss the results. Where needed, the appendix provides additional details on how
the variables are measured and the sources of the data.
We use a variety of speciﬁcations to assess the robustness of the statistical associations between
the groups of determinants and the sustainability of disinﬂations. All the regressions pool together
the G7 and LAC data. To allow for diﬀerent means, most models are estimated with a constant and
a ‘regional’ speciﬁc constant. Where appropriate, the independent variables are also interacted with
‘regional’ dummies in order to evaluate if some of the explanatory variables have diﬀerent coeﬃcients
across groups.4
4T h es a m p l eo fd i s i n ﬂations includes two episodes ending in 1999. Consequently, T +4corresponds to 2003. Since
data for that year for all the variables are not yet available yet, those episodes are excluded from the estimations.
93.1 Supply shocks
The impact of supply shocks on the inﬂation rate has inspired a proliﬁc literature, particularly
following the infamous oil shocks of the 70s. For instance, authors like Blinder (1982) put a large
weight on the impact of commodity price increases to explain the US inﬂationary burst of the late 70s.
In a similar vein, Boschen and Weiss (2003) ﬁnd evidence suggesting that world food inﬂation plays
a role in explaining inﬂationary episodes in OECD nations. Others, like Shapiro (1994) and De Long
(1997), argue that the inﬂationary episode in the US in the late 70s was not caused by the second oil
shock of the decade. The fact that supply shocks are a potentially important determinant of inﬂation
suggests that they might also be relevant factors when it comes to analyzing the sustainability of
disinﬂations.
Figure 5 depicts the average evolution of world food and oil prices across episodes. Prices have
been normalized to 100 for period T (the trough of the disinﬂations). The data has been split between
"sustainable" and "unsustainable" episodes, with S =0 .5 marking the dividing line between the two
—i.e. where S<0.5, we classify the episode in the unsustainable category; where S>0.5, the episode
is classiﬁed in the sustainable one.
In both country groups, world food prices continuously fall through period T.I n t h e L A C
countries, they continue to fall after T during sustainable episodes, but begin to increase during
unsustainable ones. In the corresponding episodes for the G7 countries, food prices increase after
period T in both instances, though rise notably more during the unsustainable episodes. All these
trends go in the expected direction if we assume a role for supply shocks in determining S.
With respect to oil prices, in the LAC countries following period T, both sustainable and un-
sustainable episodes demonstrate an upward and almost overlapping trend. This suggests that oil
shocks (before controlling for other variables) are not a key factor in determining the sustainability
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Figure 5: Average oil and world food prices across episodes. Period T+0 corresponds to the trough of the
disinﬂations. Prices in period T+0 are normalized to 100.
of disinﬂations in the LAC countries. As for the G7 chart, it shows that oil prices rise more dur-
ing unsustainable episodes, signaling perhaps that higher oil inﬂation can be associated with less
sustainable disinﬂations in those countries.5
In Table 2, the role of the diﬀerent groups of explanatory variables in determining S, is tested.
Under column (1), we report the baseline results with all the groups of explanatory variables included.
Columns (2) through (7) present the results when dropping one group at the time, while column (8)
evaluates the robustness when the G7 dummy is dropped.
Oil and food shocks are measured as the average price changes for periods T +1through T +4vis
av i sp e r i o dT (see appendix for details). Since the plot suggests that oil shocks are more important
in G7 nations, we allow for a diﬀerent slope coeﬃcient for that variable.
Table 2 shows that higher average world food inﬂation is associated with poorer sustainability
records, which is consistent with the plots. The coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant and large: a 5%
increase in world food prices causes a reduction in the sustainability index of 0.35. Oil inﬂation is
5Interestingly, in both LAC and G7 countries, oil prices rise sharply precisely after period T, notwithstanding
whether they end up being sustainable or not. This suggests that oil shocks might be an important factor triggering
in the end of the disinﬂation.
11not statistically signiﬁcant in the baseline scenario, a fact that remains true for 6 of the 7 alternative
speciﬁcations. To some readers, these results may appear surprising. Nevertheless, they are consis-
tent with the results of Boschen and Weiss (2003), who concluded that whereas world food prices
are signiﬁcant predictors of inﬂation starts in OECD nations, oil shocks are not.
3 . 2 E x c h a n g eR a t eR e g i m e
Exchange rate regimes and their role in determining inﬂation outcomes across countries has also been
a highly debated topic among economists. Until recently, the conventional wisdom seemed to be that
ﬁxed exchange rate regimes are associated with lower and less variable inﬂation rates (e.g., Gosh et
al., 1995). Indeed, those countries that with the advent of ﬂoating exchange rate regimes (following
the fall of the Bretton Woods System) were unwilling to ﬁght the inﬂationary consequences of supply
s h o c k s ,e n d e du pi nm a n yc a s e sw i t hp e r s i s t e n ti n ﬂation rates (IMF, 1999). More recently, a new
wave of research has been launched, sparked by the database created by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004),
who developed exchange rate regime indices based on de facto characteristics.6 Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
(RR) suggest that once exchange rate arrangements are ‘properly’ measured, ﬂoating regimes are no
longer associated with bad average inﬂation outcomes.
In our context, the question is whether the exchange rate regime has any inﬂuence on the sus-
tainability of disinﬂations. We use RR’s series to deﬁne two explanatory variables summarizing the
behavior of the regime. On the one hand, we test the relevance of the regime in period T, on the
other, if changes in the regime during the episode also aﬀect sustainability. Larger numbers represent
more ﬂexible regimes in the ﬁrst variable, or switching to more ﬂexible ones in the second (see the
appendix for details).
The results in Table 2 indicate that both coeﬃcients are negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
6See also Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) and Dubas, Lee and Mark (2005).
12The interpretation is that countries with more ﬂexible exchange rate regimes in period T and those
that switched to more ﬂexible arrangements thereafter, are associated with poorer sustainability
r e c o r d s .T h er e s u l t sa r em o r ei nl i n ew i t ht h o s eo fG o s het al. (1995) than with what is implied by
RR. Moreover, our ﬁndings constitute another reason underlying the fear of ﬂoating exhibited by
many nations (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
3.3 Past Inﬂation and Openness
Past Inﬂation: Previous studies (e.g., Fischer et al., 2002) have shown that the instability of
inﬂation grows with the inﬂation rate. A corollary of that ﬁnding would be that disinﬂations that
bring price increases down to low rates have a better chance of achieving stable inﬂation rates —
i.e., a sustainable disinﬂation. To further underline the plausibility of that claim, Table 3 reports
the percentage of disinﬂations that exhibit sustainability indexes above 0.7 at diﬀerent levels of πT
(inﬂation at the trough). The results in Table 3 are quite emphatic: the likelihood of achieving high
sustainablity (S > 0.7) doubles if the inﬂa t i o nt r o u g hi sl o w( 5 %o rl e s s ) . 7 Above that rate, the
trough seems to become irrelevant.
We test this idea more formally in our regressions by including a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the trough is less than 5%. If the hypothesis discussed above is right, we would expect a positive and
signiﬁcant sign for the dummy. As Table 2 shows, we obtain the expected sign, but high statistical
signiﬁcance is only achieved once the G7 dummy is dropped. The high collinearity between the two
variables is to blame —only 2 out of 31 episodes in LAC have troughs below 5%; for the G7 countries,
only 4 out of 22 episodes exhibit troughs above 5%. Future research with a greater number of LAC
episodes with low troughs will help us to disentangle whether it is the low troughs (the interpretation
we favor) or the fact of being a G7 nation (or both) that lead to better sustainability outcomes. For
7Results are robust to the level of S or the grouping of episodes according to the trough.
13now, in our sample, the two theories are observationally equivalent.
Finally, we test if inﬂation history plays a role in determining S. We illustrate the rationale for
including this determinant with the following example: Country A, after 10 straight years of having a
15% inﬂation rate, disinﬂates bringing the rate down to 3%. Alternatively, country B has 10 straight
years of 3% inﬂation, followed by an inﬂation shock which brings the rate up to 15%. The country
then disinﬂates back to 3%. Ap r i o r i , one would predict country B to have a better sustainability
record following the disinﬂation. Why? In country B, the inﬂation burst would be seen as an unusual
event, whereas in A disinﬂation would be looked at as a surprising outcome. In that sense, the same
exact policies could lead to a sustainable disinﬂation in B but not in A, assuming that agents in each
case take some time to adjust their expectations, as for instance in Carroll (2003).
We deﬁne inﬂation history as the level of inﬂation at the peak of the original disinﬂation, divided
by the average inﬂation during the ten preceding years. A number above 1 indicates that the peak
was “unusually” high —i.e., that those countries are used to lower rates. Under this deﬁnition, we
would expect a positive sign on the coeﬃcient. In Table 2, the coeﬃcients for inﬂation history are
positive but insigniﬁcant. The good news, especially for LAC nations, is that the sustainablity of
disinﬂation does not seem to be aﬀected by inﬂation history.
Openness: The role of openness in determining inﬂation has also received attention from
economists, particularly in the wake of Romer’s (1993) famous paper. More recently, authors like
Rogoﬀ (2003) and Razin (2004) have advanced the idea that globalization played an important role in
the recent worldwide disinﬂation. We contribute to the debate, providing evidence of the importance
of openness in determining the sustainability of disinﬂation. We measure openness as the average
change in the import to GDP ratio between periods T +1through T +4and periods T −3 through T.
The coeﬃcients in Table 2, contrary to the ideas stressed above, are insigniﬁcant. Notwithstanding
14whether openness aﬀects inﬂation through international competition (the globalization argument)
o rt h r o u g ha ni n ﬂation bias channel (Romer’s argument), our results suggest that sustainability is
not aﬀected by openness.
3.4 Inﬂation targeting and Fiscal Policy
Since the early 90s, an increasing number of developed and developing nations have adopted inﬂation
targeting regimes. The proponents of this monetary policy framework claim that it reduces the
variability of inﬂation, solves the time inconsistency problem and bounds inﬂation expectations, thus
leading to lower inﬂation rates (Bernanke et al., 1999). Here, we contribute to the understanding of
inﬂation targeting (IT) by testing if it allows for a better sustainability of disinﬂations.
We measure IT using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country followed an IT
rule during a certain year (see the appendix for details). In Table 2, the coeﬃcient for the inﬂation
targeting dummy is positive and mostly signiﬁcant, indicating that inﬂation targeters achieve better
sustainability records. The results should, however, be taken with caution —the robustness tests
performed below suggest that although the sign of the coeﬃcient remains positive, the statistical
signiﬁcance is not robust. In the end, our conclusion will be that there is no clear evidence that IT
signiﬁcantly increases sustainability. On the bright side, we ﬁnd that it does not do any harm either.
This inconclusive result is consistent with other ﬁndings in the empirical literature. For instance,
Ball and Sheridan (2003) show that in OECD nations, IT does not improve (nor harm) economic
performance, inclusive of its impact on inﬂation.
The second dimension of economic policy that we explore has to do with ﬁscal policy. In the sta-
bilization literature, larger ﬁscal deﬁcits increase the probability that stabilizations will fail (Hamann
and Prati, 2002). One of the reasons why ﬁscal variables are relevant is that their eﬀects on inﬂation
15can be magniﬁed if the Central Bank chooses to accommodate ﬁscal expansions. A couple of diﬀer-
ent channels are possible: (i) Central Banks could monetize part of the deﬁcit, a strategy relevant
in LAC in the 70s and 80s, or (ii) Central Banks could avoid implementing contractionary polices
where large ﬁscal deﬁcits exist (Friedman, 1994).
In our sample, we test if the initial ﬁscal conditions, represented by the budget deﬁcit as a
percentage of GDP during period T,a ﬀect S.8 A sT a b l e2s h o w s ,t h ec o e ﬃcient has the expected
sign but is insigniﬁcant. This result supports the evidence provided by Boschen and Weiss (2003),
who ﬁnd that ﬁscal related variables are not a good predictor of inﬂa t i o ns t a r t si nO E C Dc o u n t r i e s .
Contrasting this evidence with Hamann and Prati’s results suggests that ﬁscal responsibility becomes
crucial in sustaining disinﬂations starting from high inﬂation rates, but is less important when
inﬂation is low or moderate.
3.5 Political Economy Hypotheses
Partisan Factors: There is a large literature concerning the impact of the political orientation of
the party in power on diﬀerent economic aggregates (e.g. Alesina, 1988; Alesina and Roubini, 1997).
One branch of that literature explores how political orientation aﬀects the inﬂation rate. The idea,
in simple terms, is that left-wing oriented parties, when faced with a (short-run) unemployment
inﬂation trade-oﬀ, prefer a point on the Phillips curve associated with higher inﬂation and lower
unemployment rates.
In our context, such theories predict that left (right) oriented parties will deliver worse (better)
sustainability outcomes. To test that, we deﬁne dummy variables ‘right’ and ‘left’, taking the value of
1 if the orientation of the government is so classiﬁed. Coeﬃcients should be interpreted as indicating
8Testing the role of ﬁscal deﬁcits for periods T+1 through T+4 is not possible: ﬁscal variables could react to the
success or failure of the disinﬂation —i.e., endogeneity becomes an issue.
16deviations from ‘center’ oriented parties (see the appendix for details and the sources of the data).
Interestingly, the coeﬃcients in Table 2 show that if political orientation is classiﬁed as left (right),
then the sustainability record tends to be worse (better). Nevertheless, none of the eﬀects are
statistically signiﬁcant. The fact that the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant but have the expected sign,
is consistent with the ﬁndings of Boschen and Weiss (2003), who encounter similar results when
studying inﬂation starts in OECD nations.
An important caveat should be mentioned. In principle, a direct manipulation of monetary
policy by the government is only feasible if the Central Bank is not independent. To test partisan
hypotheses, it would be optimal to study the orientation of the party in power in interaction with
the degree of independence of the Central Bank. Unfortunately, there are no long cross-country
time series of CBI. On the bright side, even if Central Banks are independent, the government in
power can still aﬀect monetary policy indirectly. On the one hand, monetary policy can be set to
accommodate ﬁscal shocks (Friedman, 1994). Alternatively, the government can inﬂuence monetary
policy through its power to appoint or reappoint central bankers (Eslava, 2004; Waller, 1989).
Polity Factors: Hamann and Prati (2002) ﬁnd that countries with long-lived political regimes
are more likely to succeed in disinﬂating from high inﬂation rates. The G7 countries in our sample
have long-lived and stable regimes. By contrast, many LAC countries, particularly during the 70s
and 80s, suﬀered repeated political regime shifts. It is conceivable that the political unrest and the
instability of institutions in LAC, partly explains the gap in S vis-a-vis G7 nations, and possibly
part of the gap between the 90s and the preceding decades.
We test whether having a long-lived political regime —i.e., a proxy of political stability— accounts
for some of the variability in S. We measure that eﬀect using the Regime Durability variable in
the Polity IV database, which reports the number of years since the most recent regime change or
17the end of a transition period (see details in the appendix). Contrary to the high inﬂation scenarios
evaluated by Hamann and Prati, we ﬁnd that the variable duration is not an important determinant
of S.
Finally, we also test if democracy plays a role in explaining sustainability. During the 70s and
80s, democratic regimes were an exception in LAC countries. Moreover, as we have documented,
those years were characterized by poor sustainability records. During the 90s, however, LAC began
catching-up with G7 countries in terms of S. During this time, most LAC countries also enjoyed
democratic regimes. The question then is whether there is any causality link between the two trends.
To test this, we use the average polity index during the episode. The index, ranges from 10 (strongly
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic), as explained in the appendix. As Table 2 shows, higher
polity values are indeed associated with larger S values; the coeﬃcient, however, is only signiﬁcant
once, at the 10 percent level.
3 . 6 D o e st h eU SE x p o r tI t sI n ﬂation?
The importance of the US economy in driving the business cycle of the rest of the world has also
received a lot of attention from economists. Boschen and Weiss (2003) ﬁnd strong evidence suggesting
that US inﬂation plays an important role in triggering inﬂation abroad. Canova (2005) ﬁnds that
US monetary shocks produce signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in Latin America. By contrast, he shows that
US real demand and supply shocks generate insigniﬁcant ﬂuctuations in the typical Latin American
economy. Given such evidence, it is natural to study the impact of US inﬂation on the sustainability
of disinﬂations abroad. To test the role of US inﬂation, we re-run the regressions carried out in Table
2, adding a variable representing the average lagged US inﬂation, and dropping the variables that
were insigniﬁcant in all estimations in Table 2. Episodes from the US are excluded.
18The results, reported in Table 4, show that US inﬂation has the expected sign. The size of
the average coeﬃcient implies that a 2 percent increase in US inﬂation decreases S by 0.08. The
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant in 3 out of the 6 speciﬁcations. The results in terms of their statistical
signiﬁcance are inconclusive. The best characterization is that there is weak evidence suggesting
that US inﬂation inﬂuences the sustainablity of disinﬂations abroad.
3.7 The 90s
In section 2, we highlighted the notable improvement in S when comparing post 89 experiences to
what happened during the 70s and 80s. We noted that the ‘decade’ gap in G7 nations reaches a
value of 0.35, whereas that for LAC countries has a value of 0.6. Here we want to check if the gaps
between the 90s and the preceding decades are statistically signiﬁcant after controlling for all the
other relevant factors found in Table 2.
With those goals in mind, we ran a regression with the signiﬁcant variables used in Table 2
together with regional dummies (one for the LAC countries and one for G7 countries) interacted
with a dummy for the post-1989 episodes. If these interacted regional dummies are insigniﬁcant,
then it should be the case that the improvement in sustainability can be explained by a diﬀerent
behavior in the right-hand side variables.
The results presented in Table 5 show that —while the G7 interacted dummy is insigniﬁcant—
our set of determinants is unable to explain most of the decade gap in the LAC countries. An
important avenue for future research thus remains open. One potentially fruitful area which might
be explored, concerns central bank independence. There are currently no CBI indices that cover our
whole sample. However, this variable looks promising in accounting for part of the gap, considering
that during the late 80s and early 90s, most LAC countries made important moves towards CBI.
193.8 Robustness
Tables 4 and 5 (which evaluate the role of US inﬂation and the 90s gap) provide a ﬁrst source of
robustness tests. With the exception of the IT dummy, the results in Table 4 do not diﬀer in any
important way from those found in Table 2. The signiﬁcance of IT collapses once we take into
account the potential role of US inﬂation. The same conclusion applies to Table 5. The latter is not
surprising since the IT dummy is highly collinear with a time dummy for the 90s. Once one controls
for the ‘90s eﬀect’ the signiﬁcance of IT collapses, even though the positive sign on the coeﬃcient is
retained.
To further explore the robustness of the results, we modify the deﬁnition of S. We try a speciﬁ-
cation where M =2and N =4 , and call it S3 (inasmuch as it tracks inﬂation for 3 years). Table 6
reports the results when the estimation strategy used in Table 2 is replicated with the new deﬁnition
of sustainability. Throughout the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, both the size of the coeﬃcients and the
structure of the signiﬁcant variables are very similar to those in Table 2.
Finally, we check the robustness of US inﬂation using S3 as the dependent variable. The results
are reported in Table 7. US inﬂation appears as a signiﬁcant determinant in two out of six speciﬁ-
cations and IT in only one case. Table 7 thus corroborates the weak signiﬁcance of those variables
as explanations of the sustainability of disinﬂations.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The 1970s marked the beginning of an inﬂationary era that would plague most of the world, albeit
with varying intensity and duration. Despite numerous attempts to disinﬂate during the 70s and 80s,
the ground gained in many of those disinﬂations was rapidly lost. Conversely, the most recent round
of disinﬂations has had a more permanent eﬀect on inﬂation, both in LAC and developed nations.
20The evidence presented in this paper formally corroborates that disinﬂations in the 90s were more
sustainable than those during the two preceding decades. What are the factors that contribute to
making gains from a disinﬂation sustainable?
Our results indicate that policymakers should track carefully the evolution of world food prices,
a variable out of the control of local policymakers, but with important consequences as far as the
chances of stabilizing inﬂation after a disinﬂationary episode. Moreover, Central Banks should aim
for a low inﬂation rate since achieving an inﬂation rate of 5% or less also increases the chances of
stabilizing inﬂation. We also ﬁnd evidence that suggests that less ﬂexibility in the exchange rate
regime also favors the sustainability of disinﬂations. This constitutes another reason underlying the
fear of ﬂoating exhibited by many nations (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
Inﬂation targeting, the US inﬂation, and the degree of democracy also aﬀect sustainablity (in
the expected direction), though the statistical signiﬁcance of those variables is not robust for several
speciﬁcations. The history of recent inﬂation, ﬁscal policy and oil shocks are shown to be less
important in determining the sustainability of disinﬂations. The results concerning the relevancy
of recent inﬂation history are part of the good news for LAC nations: bad past behavior on the
inﬂationary front does not necessarily condemn them to poor sustainability outcomes in the future.
The ﬁscal policy results suggest that this variable has not been determinant in disinﬂations starting
from low and moderate peaks. Nevertheless, Hamann and Prati (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy matters
in the success of disinﬂations from high inﬂation peaks. The relevance of ﬁscal policy seems to depend
on whether we study stabilizations starting from high inﬂation rates or disinﬂations starting from
low and moderate peaks. Finally, the insigniﬁcance of oil shocks is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Boschen and Weiss (2003), who show that oil inﬂation does not play a role in starting inﬂation in
OECD nations.
21The task of understanding the determinants of sustainable disinﬂations has only begun. As stated
in the paper, the determinants used in our analysis explain a small part of the improvement in the
sustainability record of LAC countries during the 90s. We suggest that one of the missing links
might be that related to the independence of Central Banks —a typical component of the structural
reforms introduced by many LAC countries in the past decade. Should indices of CBI (long time
series) become available, research could be aimed at testing their impact on the sustainability of
disinﬂations. Another missing link is the role of (increasing?) competition. Of course, exploring this
would require the use of microeconomic data, a task beyond the goals of our paper and one harder
to implement in a cross-country setting. Nevertheless, it is certainly a factor worth exploring in the
future.
AA p p e n d i x
Variables: Data Sources
Food Prices: Food commodity prices in current dollars. Data comes from the IFS (IMF).
Oil Prices: Price of the West Texas crude oil. Data comes from the Federal Reserve Economic
Data, FRED.
Regime: Data from Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2002). RR’s regime goes from 1 to 14, where 1 is
the most ﬁxed version (no separate legal tender) and 14 corresponds to a freely ﬂoating (separate)
regime. Since the classiﬁcation is monthly, we calculate the annual averages, weighted according
to the number of months in each regime. The regime for period T takes the value assigned in RR
for the respective country in period T. Changes in the regime during the episode is the ratio of the
average regime index during the episode with respect to the value for period T.
Inﬂation Targeting: To determine which countries adopted inﬂation targeting (and when), we
22follow Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001).
Fiscal Deﬁcits: Data comes from the IFS (IMF) complemented with data from the WDI from
the World Bank and OECD Economic Outlook. Data for Jamaica was kindly provided by Edward
Ghartey.
Political Orientation: Data comes from Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groﬀ,P h i l i p
Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. “New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database
of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review. The dummy
variables ‘right’ and ‘left’ take the value of 1 if the orientation of the government is classiﬁed as such.
The database classiﬁes the orientation of the party in power as left, right or center. Where countries
do not have a democratic system of government, no classiﬁcation is assigned to the orientation. To
avoid interpreting center-oriented governments and autocracies as equivalent regimes in our estima-
tions, we have included a dummy for the latter (the results for the dummy are not shown). So the
omitted dummy is ‘Center’. ‘Left’ and ‘right’ coeﬃcients should be interpreted as deviations from
center.
Polity Factors: Data comes from the Polity IV (Polity IV, Project Integrated Network for
Societal Conﬂict Research (INSCR), Program, Center for International Development and Conﬂict
Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, College Park, www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity).
Regime Durability: The number of years since the most recent regime change (deﬁned by a three-
point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition
period deﬁned by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score).
[POLITY IV PROJECT, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002, Dataset Users
Manual, Monty G. Marshall, Center for International Development and Conﬂict Management, Uni-
versity of Maryland, College Park, and Keith Jaggers, Colorado State University.]
23Polity2: Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC
score from the DEMOC score; the resulting uniﬁed polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly demo-
cratic) to -10(strongly autocratic). Corrections to modify the combined annual POLITY score by
applying a simple ﬁx to convert instances of standardized authority scores to conventional polity
scores, as suggested in the user’s manual, have been used. See also the Polity IV user’s manual for
details on AUTOC (Institutionalized Autocracy) and DEMOC (Institutionalized Democracy) —i.e.,
the components used to build the Polity variable.
24Country Initial Final   Inflation Drop in  
 Year Year Trough Inflation ST+1 ST+2 ST+3 ST+4 S
Bolivia 1990 1993 7.6 11.7 0.87 0.70 0.94 1.09 0.90
Bolivia 1995 1999 3.1 8.1 0.97 1.23 1.15   1.12
Canada 1981 1985 3.87 7.67 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.93
Canada 1990 1993 0.88 4.43 0.89 0.73 0.85 0.90 0.85
Chile 1985 1988 14.5 9.6 0.60 0.19 0.58 1.08 0.61
Colombia 1976 1978 18.1 7.1 0.30 0.04 0.22 0.54 0.27
Colombia 1980 1983 17.2 7.7 0.73 0.59 0.81 0.16 0.57
Colombia 1990 1996 17.6 9.4 0.79 1.21 1.82 1.90 1.43
Costa Rica 1991 1993 10.1 14.7 0.59 0.36 0.61 0.87 0.61
Costa Rica 1995 1998 10.1 9.4 0.99 0.88 1.04 1.15 1.01
Dominican Rep 1974 1978 3.7 9.6 0.12 -0.10 0.57 0.74 0.33
Dominican Rep 1980 1982 6.2 8.1 0.51 -1.89 -1.32 0.63 -0.52
Dominican Rep 1984 1986 9.2 20.4 0.41 -0.31 -0.34 -0.77 -0.25
Ecuador 1974 1976 10.2 9.2 0.74 0.83 0.84 0.57 0.75
El Salvador 1974 1976 8.9 8.4 0.75 0.56 0.17 0.17 0.41
El Salvador 1980 1982 10.8 5.1 0.75 0.05 -1.48 -2.24 -0.73
El Salvador 1986 1988 16.1 11.2 0.69 0.72 1.55 1.21 1.04
El Salvador 1989 1991 9.9 9.6 0.60 0.39 1.00 1.05 0.76
El Salvador 1993 1999 0.8 14.9 0.83 0.84 0.93 0.87
France 1974 1977 9.12 3.17 1.10 1.00 0.52 0.24 0.71
France 1981 1986 2.86 9.8 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.97
France 1989 1994 1.66 1.7 0.80 1.01 1.42 1.58 1.20
Germany 1973 1978 3.09 3.94 0.63 0.33 0.39 0.70 0.52
Germany 1980 1986 -0.03 5.73 0.89 0.64 0.53 0.71 0.69
Germany 1992 1998 0.93 4.25 0.97 0.66 0.73 1.00 0.84
Guatemala 1974 1976 10.6 4.1 0.78 1.47 1.00 0.72 0.99
Guatemala 1986 1988 9.9 15.7 0.23 -0.55 0.21 0.94 0.21
Guatemala 1996 1998 5.4 4.6 0.95 0.68 0.56 0.65 0.71
Honduras 1973 1975 5.4 4.3 0.60 0.48 0.68 -1.11 0.16
Honduras 1979 1987 3.1 11.4 0.72 0.05 -1.07 -0.62 -0.23
Honduras 1990 1992 8.9 17.8 0.72 0.18 0.14 0.34 0.34
Italy 1974 1978 12.33 4.55 0.14 -0.54 -0.02 0.44 0.01
Italy 1980 1987 4.66 14.68 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.91
Italy 1990 1993 4.13 2.04 0.78 0.68 1.52 2.09 1.26
Italy 1995 1998 1.73 3.05 0.91 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.76
Jamaica 1974 1976 10 11.6 0.39 -0.63 -0.62 0.18 -0.17
Jamaica 1978 1982 7.8 21.2 0.58 0.19 0.41 0.85 0.51
Jamaica 1984 1987 6.9 18 0.80 0.50 -0.09 -1.69 -0.12
Jamaica 1994 1998 7 19.2 1.00 0.97 1.02 0.96 0.99
Japan 1974 1978 3.69 13.15 0.86 0.80 1.00 1.10 0.94
Japan 1980 1987 0.199 6.131 0.79 0.98 0.56 0.58 0.63
Japan 1990 1995 0.05 2.87 0.64 0.61 1.00 1.18 0.86
Mexico 1974 1975 13.7 5.4 -0.25 -0.65 0.45 -0.16 -0.16
Mexico 1977 1978 16.7 5.9 0.44 -0.31 -1.64 -6.60 -2.03
Mexico 1990 1993 8.2 14.6 0.27 -0.54 -0.16 0.39 -0.01
Paraguay 1973 1975 5 14.6 0.79 0.77 0.39 -0.31 0.41
Paraguay 1979 1982 8.2 15.9 0.65 0.29 -0.29 -0.11 0.14
Paraguay 1993 1996 8.8 10.1 1.00 1.11 1.10 1.03 1.06
UK 1974 1978 8.84 9.91 0.37 0.31 0.87 1.25 0.70
UK 1980 1983 4.39 11.28 0.86 0.97 1.08 1.02 0.98
UK 1984 1986 3.44 2.5 0.71 -0.05 -1.09 -0.68 -0.28
UK 1989 1993 1.91 6.75 0.84 0.87 0.92 0.80 0.86
USA 1974 1976 6.29 3.46 0.87 0.34 -0.66 -0.53 0.00
USA 1979 1983 3.78 8.25 0.98 1.14 1.13 1.00 1.06
USA 1989 1994 2.71 2.1 0.89 1.07 1.36 1.41 1.18
Venezuela 1980 1983 8 10.6 0.73 0.74 0.20 -0.46 0.30
Sustainability Original Disinflation
Table A1. Characteristics of the episodes
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Average value of S
Total 
Table 1. Average sustainability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant 1.32 *** 1.24 *** 0.25 1.18 *** 1.34 *** 1.22 *** 1.43 *** 1.33 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G7Dummy 0.41 * 0.16 0.51 ** 0.56 *** 0.40 0.50 ** 0.47 ***
(0.09) (0.41) (0.04) (0.00) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01)
Supply Shocks
Oil Inflation 0.010 0.019 ** 0.013 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.005
(0.26) (0.05) (0.12) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.46)
Oil Inflation*G7Dummy -0.004 -0.024 * -0.012 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 0.011
(0.77) (0.09) (0.26) (0.74) (0.49) (0.71) (0.17)
Food Inflation -0.07 *** -0.06 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.06 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regime
R e g i m e - 0 . 0 7* * * - 0 . 0 7* * * - 0 . 0 6* * * - 0 . 0 7* * * - 0 . 0 6* * * - 0 . 0 7* * * - 0 . 0 7* * *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
C h a n g e  i n  r e g i m e - 0 . 4 2* * * - 0 . 3 8* * * - 0 . 4 2* * * - 0 . 4 4* * * - 0 . 3 9* * * - 0 . 4 3* * * - 0 . 4 6* * *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation & openness
Openness -1.84 -1.65 -2.72 -1.49 -1.83 -2.20 * -1.46
(0.18) (0.30) (0.11) (0.29) (0.17) (0.08) (0.31)
Dummy Inflation < 5% 0.21 0.21 0.09 0.23 0.17 0.21 * 0.39 ***
(0.15) (0.18) (0.53) (0.14) (0.20) (0.09) (0.00)
Inflation history 0.035 0.011 0.004 0.028 0.021 0.041 0.028
(0.29) (0.71) (0.91) (0.41) (0.41) (0.21) (0.39)
Economic Policy
Inflation Targeting 0.35 ** 0.37 0.36 ** 0.31 * 0.35 ** 0.32 ** 0.35 ***
(0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Initial Budget Deficit 0.66 1.61 1.45 0.44 0.99 0.25 0.20
(0.68) (0.36) (0.34) (0.79) (0.55) (0.87) (0.89)
Partisan Factors
Right 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.06
(0.65) (0.72) (0.72) (0.46) (0.58) (0.61) (0.70)
Left -0.14 -0.25 -0.10 -0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.23
(0.42) (0.19) (0.64) (0.63) (0.53) (0.54) (0.14)
Polity factors
Duration 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.93) (0.48) (0.38) (0.59) (0.93) (0.53) (0.37)
Polity2 0.02 0.03 0.03 * 0.03 0.01 0.03 * 0.03
(0.38) (0.15) (0.26) (0.15) (0.53) (0.06) (0.21)
R
2 0.55 0.39 0.43 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.53
R
2 adj 0.35 0.18 0.22 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.33
Note: Robust errors. t-prob. in parentheses. ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%, 
Dependent Variable: S
Table 2. Determinants of sustainability.
29Inflation Number of
Trough observations
below 5% 20 70%
5% to 10% 20 35%
10%+ 13 38%
 % with S > 0.7
T a b l e3 .R o l eo fi n ﬂation troughs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 1.38 *** 1.51 *** 0.57 *** 1.40 *** 1.42 *** 1.36 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G7Dummy 0.42 ** 0.34 * 0.50 *** 0.58 *** 0.53 **
(0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Supply Shocks
Oil Inflation 0.015 * 0.025 *** 0.016 * 0.017 * 0.007
(0.10) (0.01) (0.08) (0.04) (0.36)
Oil Inflation*G7Dummy -0.007 -0.021 -0.013 -0.008 0.007
(0.53) (0.11) (0.22) (0.42) (0.44)
Food Inflation -0.06 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.05 *** -0.06 ***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regime
Regime -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.05 *** -0.06 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Change in Regime -0.40 *** -0.40 *** -0.43 *** -0.36 *** -0.44 ***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Inflation & openness
Openness -2.04 -2.08 -3.50 ** -2.42 * -1.68
(0.17) (0.23) (0.04) (0.06) (0.27)
Dummy Inflation < 5% 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.45 ***
(0.14) (0.30) (0.38) (0.18) (0.00)
Others
Inflation Targeting 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.25 *
(0.18) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31) (0.07)
Polity2 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.016 0.026 **
(0.22) (0.34) (0.91) (0.13) (0.02)
US Inflation
Lagged US Inf. -0.03 -0.05 *** -0.04 * -0.04 -0.04 *** -0.02
(0.13) (0.00) (0.08) (0.13) (0.01) (0.32)
R
2 0.56 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.54 0.52
R
2 adj 0.43 0.34 0.32 0.42 0.44 0.39
Note: Robust errors. t-prob. in parentheses. ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%, 
Dependent Variable: S
Table 4. The role of US inﬂation
30Variables Coefficient t-prob signif
Constant 0.91 0.00 ***
G7Dummy 0.61 0.00 ***
Oil inflation 0.010 0.15
Oil inflation*G7Dummy 0.007 0.45
Food Inflation -0.05 0.00 ***
Regime -0.05 0.01 ***
Change in regime -0.28 0.05 **
Openness -3.10 0.02 **
Dummy Inflation < 5% 0.19 0.17
Inflation targeting 0.14 0.28
Polity2 0.0003 0.97
Dummy90s*DummyG7 0.17 0.27





Note: Robust errors. ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%, 
Dependent Variable: S
Table 5. The 90s eﬀect.
31(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
constant 1.45 *** 1.40 *** 0.15 1.30 *** 1.48 *** 1.32 *** 1.57 *** 1.48 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.69) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G7Dummy 0.51 0.21 0.63 ** 0.69 *** 0.51 0.62 ** 0.56 **
(0.11) (0.41) (0.05) (0.00) (0.12) (0.02) (0.03)
Supply Shocks
Oil Inflation 0.016 0.028 ** 0.020 * 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.011
(0.14) (0.03) (0.07) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.24)
Oil Inflation*G7Dummy -0.007 -0.032 * -0.017 -0.008 -0.013 -0.007 0.011
(0.69) (0.08) (0.24) (0.65) (0.42) (0.60) (0.25)
Food Inflation -0.09 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.09 *** -0.09 *** -0.09 *** -0.08 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regime
R e g i m e - 0 . 0 9* * * - 0 . 0 8* * * - 0 . 0 8* * * - 0 . 0 9* * * - 0 . 0 8* * * - 0 . 0 9* * * - 0 . 0 9* * *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
C h a n g e  i n  r e g i m e - 0 . 5 1* * * - 0 . 4 6* * * - 0 . 5 0* * * - 0 . 5 2* * * - 0 . 4 6* * * - 0 . 5 1* * * - 0 . 5 7* * *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflation & openness
Openness -1.98 -1.73 -3.00 -1.60 -1.93 -2.31 * -1.50
(0.27) (0.41) (0.17) (0.39) (0.28) (0.16) (0.43)
Dummy Inflation < 5% 0.25 0.25 0.09 0.26 0.20 0.25 * 0.48 ***
(0.19) (0.23) (0.60) (0.19) (0.24) (0.14) (0.00)
Inflation history 0.038 0.013 -0.002 0.030 0.019 0.044 0.030
(0.33) (0.71) (0.96) (0.44) (0.54) (0.25) (0.44)
Economic Policy
Inflation Targeting 0.43 * 0.45 0.43 * 0.38 * 0.43 ** 0.40 ** 0.42 **
(0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Initial Budget Deficit 0.42 1.76 1.27 0.21 0.86 0.04 -0.15
(0.83) (0.42) (0.50) (0.92) (0.67) (0.98) (0.94)
Partisan Factors
Right 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.08
(0.64) (0.76) (0.71) (0.48) (0.59) (0.62) (0.70)
Left -0.17 -0.31 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 -0.15 -0.28
(0.44) (0.19) (0.65) (0.64) (0.54) (0.54) (0.15)
Polity factors
Duration -0.0001 0.0013 -0.0022 -0.0011 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0016
(0.95) (0.50) (0.41) (0.65) (0.93) (0.55) (0.39)
Polity2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 * 0.03
(0.52) (0.22) (0.35) (0.24) (0.64) (0.08) (0.31)
R
2 0.51 0.35 0.40 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.45
R
2 adj 0.30 0.13 0.18 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.33
Note: Robust errors. t-prob. in parentheses. ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%, 
Dependent Variable: S3
Table 6. Robustness analysis: S3
32(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
constant 1.48 *** 1.66 *** 0.48 ** 1.51 *** 1.53 *** 1.46 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G7Dummy 0.51 ** 0.39 0.59 ** 0.72 *** 0.65 ***
(0.04) (0.12) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Supply Shocks
Oil Inflation 0.020 * 0.033 *** 0.023 * 0.024 ** 0.012
(0.08) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.26)
Oil Inflation*G7Dummy -0.011 -0.029 * -0.020 -0.014 0.006
(0.42) (0.09) (0.15) (0.33) (0.61)
Food Inflation -0.07 *** -0.06 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 ***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Regime
Regime -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.06 *** -0.07 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Change in Regime -0.48 *** -0.48 *** -0.50 *** -0.43 ** -0.52 ***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Inflation & openness
Openness -2.07 -2.12 -3.81 * -2.54 -1.65
(0.29) (0.35) (0.08) (0.13) (0.41)
Dummy Inflation < 5% 0.28 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.56 ***
(0.13) (0.28) (0.36) (0.18) (0.00)
Others
Inflation Targeting 0.24 0.23 0.18 0.19 0.33 *
(0.19) (0.30) (0.34) (0.29) (0.08)
Polity2 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 **
(0.23) (0.34) (0.90) (0.14) (0.03)
US Inflation
Lagged US Inf. -0.03 -0.06 *** -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 *** -0.02
(0.24) (0.01) (0.14) (0.21) (0.04) (0.47)
R
2 0.52 0.40 0.41 0.49 0.51 0.48
R
2 adj 0.39 0.28 0.28 0.38 0.40 0.35
Note: Robust errors. t-prob. in parentheses. ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%, 
Dependent Variable: S3
Table 7. Robustness analysis (S3): Role of US Inﬂation
33